Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms within the European Monetary Union

The interest in transmission mechanisms has revived since the EMU was established. Within such a heterogeneous framework, in fact, it is fundamental to appraise how the one size fits all monetary policy affects every single member. This paper presents an analysis in this direction through the estimation of a VAR model using nation-wide time series. Furthermore, given that data coverage is now becoming wide enough, it provides a verification of the impulse-response functions structural stability. This paper provides evidence of a structural break for Austria and Germany and of asymmetric effects within the EMU, which are not so big to make the one size fits all monetary policy a challenging task, however.

The Comovements between Futures Markets for Crude Oil: Evidence from a Structural GARCH Model

This paper studies the linkages between the prices of oil futures traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange and the Intercontinental Exchange of London. We estimate a structural BEKK-GARCH model that allows for non-zero correlation between the structural innovations. We identify the structural parameters through restrictions on the reduced-form GARCH model. We find that the oil futures traded on the NYMEX and ICE can be used for mutual hedging purposes only when the structural conditional variances of both innovations are modest and, as such, no turbulent events have taken place. Periods with positive structural correlations are instead associated with peaks in the structural conditional variance of both innovations. During times of market turmoil, the structural variance of the returns on NYMEX futures becomes larger than that of ICE futures. This means that, when there are common shocks to both markets, the NYMEX reacts more strongly than the ICE. Our empirical evidence explains the negative reduced-form correlation between the two returns which is observed in turbulent periods.oil prices; futures markets; GARCH; structural VAR

The co-movements along the forward curve of natural gas futures: a structural view

This paper studies the co-movements between the daily returns of forwards on natural gas traded in the NYMEX with maturity of 1, 2 and 3 months. We identify a structural multivariate BEKK model using a recursive assumption whereby shocks to the volatility of the returns are transmitted from the short to the long section of the forward curve. We find strong evidence of spillover effects in the conditional first moments, for which we show that the transmission mechanism operates from the shorter to the longer maturity. In terms of reduced form conditional second moments, the shortest the maturity, the higher the volatility of the return, and the more the returns become independent from the others and follow the dynamics of the underlying commodity. The evidence from the structural second moments indicates that the longer the maturity is, the higher the uncertainty about the returns. We also show that the higher the structural variance of a maturity relative to that of another maturity, the stronger the correlation between the two.natural gas prices; forward markets; GARCH; structural VAR

Along the Forward Curve for Natural Gas: Unobservable Shocks and Dynamic Correlations

This paper studies the comovements between the daily returns of forwards on natural gas traded in the NYMEX with maturity of 1, 2 and 3 months. We identify a structural multivariate BEKK model using a recursive assumption whereby shocks to the volatility of the returns are transmitted from the short to the long section of the forward curve. We find strong evidence of spillover effects both in the conditional first and second moments. In the conditional mean, we show that the transmission mechanism operates from the longer to the shorter maturity. In terms of reducedform conditional second moments, the shortest the maturity, the higher the volatility of the return, and the more the returns become independent from the others and follow the dynamics of the underlying commodity. The evidence from the structural second moments indicates that the longer the maturity is, the higher is the uncertainty about the returns. We also show that the higher the structural variance of a return relative to that of another return, the stronger the correlation is between the two.natural gas prices; forward markets; GARCH; structural VAR

Are banks more opaque? Evidence from insider trading

We use trades by US corporate insiders to investigate bank opacity, both in absolute terms and relative to other firms. On average, bank insider sales do not earn an abnormal return and do not predict stock returns. By contrast, bank insider purchases do, even though less than other firms. Our within-banking sector and over-time analyses also fail to provide evidence of greater opacity of banks vis-à-vis other firms. These results challenge conventional wisdom and suggest that, to assess bank opacity, the type of benchmark (transparency vs. other firms) and transaction/information (purchase/positive vs. sale/negative) are crucial

Bank Deregulation, Competition and Economic Growth: The US Free Banking Experience

We exploit the introduction of free banking laws in US states during the 1837-1863 period to examine the impact of removing barriers to bank entry on bank competition and economic growth. As governments were not concerned about systemic stability in this period, we are able to isolate the effects of bank competition from those of state implicit guarantees. We find that the introduction of free banking laws stimulated the creation of new banks and led to more bank failures. Our empirical evidence indicates that states adopting free banking laws experienced an increase in output per capita compared to the states that retained state bank chartering policies. We argue that the fiercer bank competition following the introduction of free banking laws might have spurred economic growth by (1) increasing the money stock and the availability of credit; (2) leading to efficiency gains in the banking market. Our findings suggest that the more frequent bank failures occurring in a competitive banking market do not harm long-run economic growth in a system without public safety nets

Three essays in banking : theory and empirics

This thesis revolves around financial instability and banking regulation. The first chapter examines whether the disclosure of information about banks maximizes welfare in times of crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that transparency is optimal only if banks' distress can be efficiently resolved. The second chapter provides an explanation for the observed inability of market participants to assess banks' solvency in times of crisis. We demonstrate that banks' incentives to understate losses lead to an equilibrium where no information is available in the market in times of crisis, and this makes banks take excessive risk ex-ante. The third chapter, coauthored with Philipp Ager, provides an empirical analysis of the effects of liberalization on bank competition and bank failures. Using the relaxation of bank entry barriers in the 19th century US as a case study, we find that liberalization increases bank entry by 11% and bank failures by 2.6%.Aquesta tesi tracta sobre la inestabilitat financera i la regulació bancària. El primer capítol examina si la divulgació d'informació sobre els bancs maximitza el benestar en temps de crisi. Contràriament a la saviesa convencional, es demostra que la transparència és òptima només si els problemes dels bancs es poden resoldre de manera eficient. El segon capítol ofereix una explicació de la incapacitat observada dels participants del mercat per avaluar la solvència dels bancs en temps de crisi. Es demostra que els incentius dels bancs a subestimar les pèrdues porten a un equilibri en el qual no hi ha informació disponible al mercat en temps de crisi, i on els bancs prenen riscos excessius ex-ante. El tercer capítol, en coautoria amb Philipp Ager, proporciona una anàlisi empírica dels efectes de la liberalització sobre la competència bancària i fallides bancàries. Utilitzant la relaxació de les barreres a l'entrada dels bancs als EUA al segle XIX com a cas d'estudi, ens trobem que la liberalització augmenta l'entrada de bancs en un 11% i la fallida de bancs en un 2,6%

Bank entry regulation and financial development: The US free banking experience

We examine how the relaxation of barriers to bank entry affects financial development by exploiting the introduction of free banking laws in US states during 1830-1860, a period when regulatory barriers to bank exit were more limited than today. Free banking laws led to an expansion of the banking sector. Further evidence on the exit probability and growth of incumbent banks, as well as the higher growth of industries for which external finance is presumably more relevant, reveal improvements in allocative efficiency. Our findings highlight the importance of both entry and exit barriers in the process of selection among banks

Why banks want to be complex

We investigate whether and how bank complexity affects performance and systemic risk. We base the analysis on a complexity measure that captures diversification and diversity, controlling for size and other bank characteristics. We find that more complex banks exhibit a higher profitability, lower risk, and higher market share. Moreover, we show an inversely U-shaped relation between bank complexity and banks’ sensitivity to systemic shocks. The evidence challenges the view that higher bank complexity is per se bad and is consistent with theoretical models that show that diversity in the banking system is critical for financial stability